A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights
Waldron, Jeremy
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 13, no. 1 (1993): 18-51
https://www.jstor.org/stable/764646
“‘Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights).’ ‘Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override.’ ‘There would be no point in the boast that we respect individual rights unless that involved some sacrifice, and the sacrifice in question must be that we give up whatever marginal benefits our country would receive from overriding these rights when they prove inconvenient.’
These are familiar propositions of political philosophy. What do they imply about institutions?”
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