On the Expressive Function of Law
Sunstein, Cass
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 144, no. 5 (1996): 2021-2053
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3312647
“Actions are expressive; they carry meanings. This is true for nearly everything we do, from the most mundane to the most significant. For example, a lawyer who wears a loud tie to court will be signalling something distinctive about his self-conception and his attitude toward others; so too with a law professor who teaches in blue jeans; so too with a student who comes to class in a business suit. What can be said for nonverbal acts applies to purely verbal statements as well. A bank president who uses the terms “Miss” and “Mrs.,” or who refers to African Americans as “Negroes,” will be showing a wide range of things about his attitudes on matters of gender and race. So too with a Southern politician who uses the terms “Ms.” and “African American.”
In these and other cases, what the agent will be communicating, or be taken to mean, may or may not have a great deal to do with his particular intentions. In this sense, the meanings of actions are not fully within the agent’s control. Indeed, some agents may not even be aware of the relevant meanings. Consider a foreigner whose very foreignness is often signalled by obliviousness to the social meanings of his actions. What he says may be very different from what he means. ”
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