Social Norms and Social Roles
Sunstein, Cass
Columbia Law Review 96 (1996): 903
https://doi.org/10.2307/1123430
“Economists have invented a game: the ultimatum game. The people who run the game give some money, on a provisional basis, to the first of two players. The first player is told to offer some part of the money to the second player. If the second player accepts that amount, he can keep what is offered, and the first player gets to keep the rest. But if the second player rejects the offer, neither player gets anything. Both players are informed that these are the rules. No bargaining is allowed. Using standard assumptions about rationality, self-interest, and choice, economists predict that the first player should offer a penny and the second player should accept.
This is not what happens. ”
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